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Abstract: We define a new notion of conditional 
belief, which plays the same role for Dempster­
Shafer belief functions as conditional probability 
does for probability functions. Our definition is dif­
ferent from the standard definition given by Demp­
ster, and avoids many of the well-known problems 
of that definition. Just as the conditional prob­
ability Pr(·IB) is a probability function which is 
the result of conditioning on B being true, so too 
our conditional belief function Bel( ·I B) is a belief 
function which is the result of conditioning on B 
being true. We define the conditional belief as the 
lower en'llelope (that is, the infimum) of a family 
of conditional probability functions, and provide a 
closed-form expression for it. We show by example 
the intuitive appeal of our definition, and compare 
it in detail to the more standard definition, showing 
why and how it differs. 
1 Introduction 
How should one update one's belief given new ev­
idence? If beliefs are expressed in terms of proba­
bility, then the standard approach is to use condi­
tioning. If an agent's original estimate of the prob­
ability of A is given by Pr(A), and then some new 
evidence, say B, is acquired, then the new estimate 
is given by the conditional probability Pr(AIB), 
defined as Pr(A n B)/Pr(B).1 
The Dempster-Shafer approach to reasoning 
about uncertainty [Sha76] has recently become 
quite popular in expert systems applications (see, 
for example, [Abe88, Fal88, LU88, LG83]). This 
approach uses belief functions, a class of functions 
that satisfy three axioms, somewhat related to the 
axioms of probability. In this paper, we consider 
how to define a. notion of conditional belief, which 
generalizes conditional probability. 
1 Thie definition ie not completely uncontrovereial ( aee, 
e.g., [DZ82) for a diecu11ion and further references). 
One definition for conditional belief was already 
suggested by Dempster [Dem67J, and is derived us­
ing the rule of combination; hereafter we refer to 
Dempster's definition a.s the DS definition of con­
ditional belief. Although the DS definition also gen­
eralizes conditional probability, it is well known to 
give counterintuitive results in a. number of situa­
tions (see, e.g., [Ait68, Bla87, Dia78, DZ82, Hun87, 
Lem86, Pea.88, Pea.89, Za.d84]) We provide here 
a. new definition of conditional belief, which also 
generalizes conditional probability, but is different 
from the DS definition in general. We can show 
that our definition avoids many of the problems as­
sociated with the DS definition. 
The motivation for our definition of conditional 
belief comes from probability theory. It is well 
known that a. belief function Bel is the lower en­
'l!elope of the family of a.ll probability functions Pr 
consistent with Bel. That is, Bel( A) is the infimum 
of Pr(A), where the infimum is taken over a.ll pro.b­
a.bility functions Pr such that Bel( A') � Pr(A') for 
a.ll A'.2 We define Bel(AIB) to be the lower enve­
lope of the family of a.ll functions Pr(·IB) where 
Pr is consistent with Bel (similarly to the situa­
tion with conditional probability, we assume that 
Bel(B) > 0, so that everything is well defined). 
Although we define Bel( ·I B) in terms ofa.lower en­
velope, we show that there is an elegant closed form 
expression for it. Moreover, we can show that just 
a.s the conditional probability function is in fact a 
probability function, our conditional belief function 
is a belief function. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In 
the next section, we review belief functions and de­
fine our notion conditional belief. We show how it 
compares to the DS notion by applying both defi-
2 Some author& (e.g., [DP88]) have used the term lower 
probability to denote what we are calling lower envelopes. 
We have ueed the term lower envelope here to avoid con· 
fuaion with Dempeter'& technical uaage of the phraae lower 
probability in [Dem67, Dem68J, which, although related, is 
not equivalent to what we are calling a lower envelope. 
nitions to the well-known three pri1oner1 problem 
[Gar61, Dia78]. We then conduct a more thor­
ough investigation of the differences between the 
two notions, and their relationship to conditional 
probability, showing why the DS notion occasion­
ally provides counterintuitive answers. In Section 4 
we discuss the relationship between belief functions 
and sets of probability functions. We conclude in 
Section 5 with some discussion on the implications 
of our results to the use of belief functions. 
2 Updating belief functions 
Recall that a probability space is a tuple ( S, X, Pr ), 
where S is the sample space, X is a collection of sub­
sets of S containing S and closed under complemen­
tation and countable union, and Pr is a probability 
function defined on X. Note that Pr is defined not 
on all subsets of S, but only on the sets in X, tra­
ditionally called the mea1urable sets. Subsets of S 
not in X are called nonmea1urable. 
The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence [Sha76] 
provides an approach to attaching likelihoods to 
events that is different from probability theory. The 
theory starts out with a belief function. For every 
event (i.e., set) A, the belief in A, denoted Bel( A), 
is a number in the interval [0, 1] that places a lower 
bound on likelihood of A. We have a corresponding 
number Pl(A) = 1- Bel(A), called the plausibility 
of A, which places an upper bound on the likelihood 
of A. Thus, to every event A we can attach the in­
terval [Bel(A), Pl(A)]. Like a probability measure, 
a belief function assigns a "weight" to subsets of a 
set S, but unlike a probability measure, the domain 
of a belief function is always taken to be all subsets 
of S. Formally, a belief function Bel on a set S is 
a function Bel: 25 -+ [0, 1] satisfying: 
BO. Bel(0) = 0 
Bl. •Bel( A)� 0 
B2. Bel(S) = 1 
B3. Bel(A1 u ... u A.�:)� 
LI!;{l, ... ,A:},I:f:0 ( -1)111+1 Bel(niEI Ai). 
We remark that a probability function defined on 
all of 25 is easily seen to be a belief function. 
In a companion paper [HF90], we argue that 
there are two quite distinct ways of relating be­
lief functions to probability theory. One approach 
views belief as a generalized probability; the sec­
ond views it as a way of representing evidence. H 
we would like to update beliefs, then it seems most 
appropriate to view beliefs as generalized probabil­
ities. There are a number of ways of doing this 
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[Dem67, Dem68, FH89b, Kyb87, Sha79]. We fo­
cus on one here, since it is perhaps the most well 
known: that is the approach of viewing a belief 
function as an infimum of a family of probability 
functions. Given a set 1' of probability functions 
all defined on a sample space S, define the lower 
en11elope of 1' to be the function J such that for 
each A� S, we have f(A) = inf {Pr(A) : Pr E 1'}. 
We have the corresponding definition of the upper 
en '!I elope of 1'. It was already known to Dempster 
[Dem67) that a belief function can be viewed as a 
lower envelope. More formally, let Bel be a belief 
function defined on S, and let ( S, X, Pr) be a prob­
ability space with sample space S. We say that Pr 
is consistent with Bel if Bel(A) � Pr(A) � Pl(A) 
for each A E X. Intuitively, Pr is consistent 
with Bel if the probabilities assigned by Pr are 
consistent with the intervals [Bel( A), Pl(A)] given 
by the belief function Bel. It is easy to see that 
Pr is consistent with Bel if Bel(A) � Pr(A) for 
each A E X (that is, it follows automatically that 
Pr(A) � PI( A) fo� each A E Xl:_ This is because 
Pl(A) = 1 - Bel(A) �· 1 - Pr(A) = Pr(A). Let 
1'Bel be the set of all probability functions defined 
on 25 consistent with Bel. The next theorem tells 
us that the belief function Bel is the lower envelope 
of 1'Bel1 and Pl is the upper envelope. 
Theorem 2.1: Let Bel be a belief function on S. 
Then for all A� S, 
Bel(A) = infp,e-p8,1 Pr(A) 
Pl(A) = supp,E'Ps., Pr(A). 
We remark that the converse to Theorem 2.1 
does not hold: not every lower envelope is a be­
lief function. Counterexamples are well known 
[Bla87, Dem67, Kyb87]. We return to this issue 
in Section 3. 
Theorem 2.1 suggests how we might update a 
belief function to a conditional belief function (and 
a plausibility function to a conditional plau1ibility 
function). We define: 
Bel(AIB) = inf Pr(AiB) 
P•E'Psel 
Pl(AIB) = sup Pr(AiB). 
P•E'Psel 
It is not hard to see that the infimum and supre­
mum above are not well-defined unless Bel( B) > 0; 
therefore, we define Bel(AIB) and Pl(AIB) only if 
Bei(B) > 0. It is straightforward to check that if 
Bel is actually the probability function Pr, then 
Bel( AlB) = Pr(AIB). Thus, our definition of con­
ditional belief generalizes that of conditional prob­
ability. Note that taking B = true in the preceding 
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definition, we get as a special case that Bei(A) = 
infp,e1'8,1 Pr(A) and Pl(A) = supp,E1's.t Pr(A), 
which is Theorem 2.1 above. 
Our definition of conditional belief and plausibil­
ity does not give us much help in computing these 
expressions. We would like to have a closed-form 
expression for them. We can in fact provide an 
elegant closed-form expression, as shown in the fol­
lowing theorem. 
Theorem 2.2: If Bel is a belief function on S such 
that Bei(B) > O, then 
Bei(AIB) = 
Bel(A n B) 
Bel( An B)+ Pl(A n B) 
Pl(AIB) = 
PI( An B) 
Pl(A n B)+ Bel(A n B) 
The expressions given above for conditional belief 
and plausibility are quite natural. Not sm.11risingly, 
it turns out that other authors have discovered 
them as well. In particular, essentially these ex­
pressions appear in [Wal81], [SK89], and [dCLM90]. 
Indeed, it even appears (lost in a. welter of notation) 
as Equation 4.8 in [Dem67]! (Interestingly, none of 
these papers references any other work as the source 
of the formula.) 
It is well known that the conditional probability 
function is a probability function. That is, if we 
start with a probability function Pr on S, and B is 
a subset of S such that Pr(B) > 0, then the func­
tion Pr(·IB) is a probability function. We might 
hope that the same situation holds with belief func­
tions, so that the conditional belief and plausibility 
functions are indeed belief and plausibility func­
tions. Given our definitions of conditional belief 
and plausibility as lower and upper envelopes, it is 
not clear that this should he so, since lower and up­
per envelopes of arbitrary sets of probability func­
tions do not in general result in belief and plau­
sibility functions. Fortunately, as the next result 
shows, in this case they do. Thus, we have a way 
of updating belief and plausibility functions to give 
us new belief and plausibility functions in the light 
of new information. 
Theorem 2.3: Let Bel be a belief function defined 
on S, and PI the corresponding plausibility func­
tion. Let B � S be such that Bel(B) > 0� Then 
Bel(·IB) is a belief junction and Pl(·IB) is the cor­
responding plausibility function. 
The proof of Theorem 2.3 is somewhat difficult. 
We outline the proof in the appendix; full details 
can be found in the full paper [FH89a]. We remark 
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that this result-which we view as the main tech­
nical result of the paper-appears in none of the 
papers cited above that contain the expression for 
conditional belief from Tlteorem 2.2. In [dCLM90] 
the question of whether Bel( ·I B) is a belief function 
is discussed, but left unanswered. 
As we mentioned in the introduction, our defi­
nition is quite different from that given by Demp­
ster. Given a belief function Bel , Dempster defines 
a conditional belief function Bel(·IIB) as follows 
[Sha76, p. 97]:3 
Bel(AIIB) = 
Bel( Au B)- Bel(B)
. 
1- Bel(B) 
The corresponding plausibility function is shown to 
satisfy: 
Pl(AIIB) = 
PI( An B) 
Pl(B) . 
A brief glance at the DS definition compared with 
the formula in Theorem 2.2 should convince the 
reader that in general these two definitions of con­
ditional belief will not agree. It is easy to show 
that both definitions of conditional belief general­
ize the standard definition of conditional probabil­
ity as long as all sets are measurable, that is, have 
a probability assigned to them. The key difference 
turns out to be in the way they treat nonmeasurable 
sets. (See [FH89b] for a discussion of nonmeasur­
able sets and their relationship to belief functions.) 
We return to this issue below; we first consider an 
example that highlights the differences between the 
two approaches. 
Example: In order to compare our updating tech­
nique with that of Dempster, we consider the well­
known three prisoner11 problem.4 
Of three prisoners a, b, and c, two are 
to be executed but a does not know which. 
He therefore says to the jailer, "Since ei­
ther b or c is certainly going to be ex­
ecuted, you will give me no information 
about my own chances if you give me the 
name of one man, either b or c, who is go­
ing to be executed." Accepting this argu­
ment, the jailer truthfully replies, "b will 
be executed." Thereupon a feels happier 
1Dempacer't definition is uaually given aa a special ap­
plication of a more {eneral 1'Uie of combination for belief 
functions. It would take us too far afield here co discuaa the 
rule of combination; aee the companion paper (HF90] for a 
ditcuaaion of the role of the rule of combination. 
4 For an excellent introduction to the problem as well a• a 
Bayeaian aolution, see (Gar61]. Our description of the story 
ia taken from (Dia78] and much of our discuuion is baaed on 
that of Diaconis and Zabell [Dia78, DZ82]. 
because before the jailer replied, his own 
chance of execution was two-thirds, but 
afterwards there are only two people, him­
self and c, who could be the one not ex­
ecuted, and so his chance of execution is 
one-half. 
Note that in order for a to believe that his own 
chance of execution was two-thirds before the jailer 
replied, he seems to be implicitly assuming that 
the one to get pardoned is chosen at random from 
among a, b, and c. We make this assumption ex­
plicit in the remainder of our discussion. 
Is a justified in believing that his chances of es­
caping have improved? It seems that the jailer did 
not give him any relevant extra information. Yet 
how could a's subjective probabilities change if he 
does not acquire any relevant extra information? 
Following [DZ82], we model a possible situation 
by an ordered pair (:c, y), where :c, y E {a, b, c}. In­
tuitively, a pair ( :c, y) represents a situation where 
:c is pardoned and the jailer says that y will be ex­
ecuted in response to a's question. Since the jailer 
answers truthfully, we cannot have :c = y; since 
the jailer will never tell a directly that a will be 
executed, we cannot have y = a. Thus, the set 
of possible outcomes is {(a, b), (a, c) , (b, c) , (c, b)}. 
The event that a lives, which we denote livea-a, 
corresponds to the set {(a, b), (a, c)}. Similarly, we 
define the events livea-b and livea-c, which corre­
spond to the sets {(b, c)} and {(c, b)}, respectively. 
By assumption, each of these three events has prob­
ability 1/3. 
The event that the jailer says b, which we de­
note aaya-b, corresponds to the set {(a, b), (c, b)}; 
the story does not give us a probability for this 
event. In order to do a Bayesian analysis of the 
situation, we will need this probability. Note that 
we do know that the probability of {(c, b)} is 1/3; 
we just need to know the probability of {(a, b)}. 
This depends on the jailer's strategy in the one case 
that he has free choice, namely when a lives. He 
gets to choose between saying b and c in that case. 
We need to know the probability that he says b, 
i.e., Pr( aaya-bjlivea-a ). 
If we assume that the jailer chooses at ran­
dom between saying b and c if a is pardoned, so 
that Pr( aaya-bjlivea-a) = 1/2, then Pr( {(a, b)}) = 
Pr( {(a, c)})= 1/6, and Pr(aaya-b) = 1/2. We can 
now easily compute that 
Pr( livea-ajaaya-b) 
= Pr(livea-a n aaya-b)/Pr(aaya-b) 
(1/6)/(1/2) = 1/3. 
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Thus, in this case, the jailer's answer does not affect 
a's probability. 
Suppose more generally that Pr( aaya-bllives-a) 
= a:, for 0 :5 a: :5 1. Then straightforward compu­
tations show that 
Pr( {(a, b)}) Pr(livea-a) X Pr(aaya-bjlivea-a) 
= a:/3 
Pr(aaya-b) = Pr( {(a, b)} )+Pr( {(c, b)})= (a:+1)/3 
Pr(livea-ajaaya-b) = 
( 
a:/3
)/ 
= a:/(a: + 1). 
a: + 1 3 
This says that if a:#; 1/2 (i.e., if the jailer had a par­
ticular preference for answering either b or c when 
a was the one pardoned) , then a would learn some­
thing from the answer, in that he would change his 
estimate of the probability that he will be executed. 
For example, if a: = 0, then if a is pardoned, the 
jailer will definitely say c. Thus, if the jailer actu­
ally says b, then a knows that he is definitely not 
pardoned, i.e., that Pr(livea-aiaaya-b) = 0. Sim­
ilarly, if a: = 1, then a knows that if either he 
or c is pardoned, then the jailer will say b, while 
if b is pardoned the jailer will say c. Given that 
the jailer says b, then from a's point of view the 
one pardoned is equally likely to be him or c; thus, 
Pr(live•-al•ays-b) = 1/2. As a: ranges from 0 to 
1, it is easy to check that Pr(livea-aiaaya-b) ranges 
from 0 to 1/2. 
How can we capture this situation using a belief 
function? It seems reasonable that if Bel is the be­
lief function and PI the corresponding plausibility 
function used to capture the situation, then Bel 
should agree with probability function where the 
probability is known, so that, a priori, both the 
belief and plausibility of the events li'lles-a, li'lles-b, 
and li'IJt:s-c should be 1/3. All we know about the 
a priori probability of says-b is that it lies between 
1/3 and 2/3: it is at least the probability that c 
is chosen (since in that case the jailer must say b), 
and it cannot be more than the probability that 
b is not chosen. Thus, we assume that Bel satis­
fies Bel(aay-b) = 1/3 and Pl(aay-b) = 2/3. Simi­
larly, we can argue that Bel( live a-a n aaya-b) = 0 
while Pl(livea-a n aaya-b) = 1/3. Plugging these 
numbers into our formulas, it is easy to compute 
that Bel(livea-aii•aya-b) = Pl(livea-aiiaaya-b) = 
1/2. Thus, for the DS notion of conditional 
probability, the range reduces to the single point 
1/2. By way of contrast, it is easy to check that 
Bel(livea-ajaaya-b) = 0 while Pl(livea-ajaaya-b) = 
1/2. I 
This example shows that the two notions of con­
ditioning can give quite different answers. The 
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range [0, 1/2] computed by our notion of condition­
ing is easy to explain: it is precisely the range de­
termined by letting the probability that the jailer 
will say b in the one situation that he has a choice 
between saying b and c, namely, when a is the one 
pardoned, range from 0 to 1. The fact that our 
definition gives this range is not an accident! It is 
a direct consequence of our definitions and Theo­
rem 2.2. 
The range [1/2, 1/2] determined by the DS no­
tion of conditioning seems much more mysterious. 
The answer 1/2 corresponds to the situation where 
the jailer says b whenever he can (i.e., whenever a is 
pardoned or c is pardoned). Why is this a reason­
able answer? More importantly, why does it arise? 
Is there a natural probabilistic interpretation for it? 
In the full paper, we consider this issue in detail. 
The following construction, which is a generaliza­
tion of the "beehive" example in [SK89] (as well 
as being a formalization of some comments made 
in [dCLM90]), may help provide a partial explana­
tion. 
Suppose a set S is partitioned into (nonempty) 
disjoints sets X1, • • •  , Xk. An agent chooses X; with 
probability a; (where a1 + · · · + ak = 1) and then 
chooses z: E X; with some unknown probability. 
Given subsets A and B of S, we want to know what 
the probability is that the element z: chosen is in A, 
and the probability that x is in A given that it is in 
B. H A = X;, then it is clear that the probability 
that x E A is a;. However, if A is not one of the 
X;'s, then all we can compute are upper and lower 
bounds on the probability. 
Let 'P be the set of probability functions on S 
consistent with this situation; namely, Pr E 'P iff 
Pr(X;) = a;, fori= 1, . .. , k. Let Bel be the lower 
envelope of 'P; it is not hard to show that Bel is a 
belief function (we do so in the full paper). It seems 
reasonable to argue that the best lower and upper 
bounds we can give on the probability that z: E A 
are Bel(A) and Pl(A). Similarly, the best lower 
and upper bounds we can give on the probability 
that z: E A given that x E B are given by the 
infimum and supremum of {Pr(AIB) : Pr E 'P}. 
These are precisely Bel(AIB) and Pl(AIB). 
Now suppose we slightly change the rules of the 
game. We are told that the probabilistic process 
that chooses an element in X; will definitely choose 
an element in B if possible. This does not affect 
anything if X; � B or if X; � B. However, if 
X; n B #- 0 and X; n B #- 0, then, rather than 
choosing X; with probability a;, the probability is 
now redistributed so that X; n B is chosen with 
probability a;, while X; n B is chosen with proba-
321 
bility 0. The probability that used to be spread over 
all of X; is now concentrated on X; n B. What is 
the probability that an element of A is chosen given 
that the element chosen is definitely in B with re­
spect to this new process, where an element of B 
is chosen whenever possible? We now have to con­
sider the family 'P' of probability functions consis­
tent with this new process, and take the infimum 
and supremum of {Pr'(AIB) : Pr E 'P'}. As we 
show in the full paper, these bounds are given by 
Bel(AIJB) and Pl(AIIB). 
Suppose we now reconsider the three prisoners 
problem from this point of view. We can now 
see that Bel(lives-aiJsays-b) gives the probability 
that a lives given the extra hypothesis that the 
jailer says b whenever possible. In particular, this 
means that the jailer definitely says b if a is the 
one that is pardoned; i.e., Pr( says-bJlives-a) = 1. 
Under this revised situation, the probability that 
a lives given that the jailer says b is indeed ex­
actly 1/2. With this understanding of the DS no­
tion of updating, the result Bel(lives-aJJsays-b) = 
Pl(lives-aJJsays-b) = 1/2 should come as no sur­
prise. 
To sununarize, this discussion has shown that 
Bel(AIIB) corresponds to a somewhat unnatural 
updating process, where before we condition with 
respect to B, we first try to choose an element 
in B whenever possible. In terms of the process 
discussed above, it is easy to see that this extra 
step before updating makes no differen�e if B is 
the union of some of the X; 's. This amounts to B 
being a measurable set. It will make a difference if 
B is not measurable. This is the case in the three 
prisoner problem, where says-b is not a measurable 
set, and is the cause of the answer 1/2 that we get 
when we try to apply DS conditioning in this case. 
We remark that this analysis can also be 
used to explain the well-known observation that 
Bel(AIB) � Bel(AIIB) � Pl(AIIB) � Pl(AIB) 
([Dem67, Dem68]; see also [Kyb87]). Not 
only does it show why the interval defined 
by [Bel( AlB), Pl(AIB)] contains that defined by 
[Bel(AIIB), Pl(AIIB)], it explains when and why 
we get equality. See the full paper for details. 
3 Belief functions and lower en­
velopes 
Theorem 2.1 says that each belief function is the 
lower envelope of a set of probability functions, and 
each plausibility function an upper envelope. Un­
fortunately, the lower envelope of an arbitrary set 
of probability functions is not in general a belief 
function, nor is the upper envelope of an arbitrary 
set of probability functions in general a plausibil­
ity function. Nevertheless, results such as Theo­
rem 2.3 show that there are natural sets of proba­
bility functions that do induce belief and plausibil­
ity functions. Although a general characterization 
is lacking, further examples in [FH89b, HF90] sug­
gest that this is not an isolated example. 
However, even if a set P of probability functions 
does induce a belief and plausibility function, say 
Bel and PI, it is reasonable to ask whether we 
should represent P by Bel and Pl. Clearly the 
answer depends very much on the intended appli­
cation. However, it is worth noting that this rep­
resentation of P might result in a loss of valuable 
information. For example, consider a sample space 
consisting of three points, say {a, b, c}. Let P con­
sist of all probability functions on S with the follow­
ing three properties: (1) 1/4 � Pr({a}) � 1/2, (2) 
1/4 � Pr({b}) � 1/2, and (3) Pr({a}) = Pr({b}). 
It is not hard to show that the lower envelope of P 
is a belief function. If we call this belief function 
Bel and take PI to be the corresponding plausi­
bility function, we get Bel({a}) = Bel({b}) = 1/4 
and PI( {a}) = PI( {b}) = 1/2. Thus, we retain 
the information that the probability of a and b 
both range between 1/4 and 1/2. However, we 
have lost the information that the probabilities of 
a and b are the same in all the probability func­
tions in P. This loss of information has some se­
rious repercussions. As we show in the full paper 
(by extending the example above), one consequence 
is that updates do not commute. More precisely, 
suppose we start with a belief function Bel on a 
set S, observe B � S and then observe C � S. 
The result is the belief function BeiB(·IC), where 
Be18(A) = Bei(AIB). Similarly, if we observe C 
and then B, we get the belief function Belc(·IB). 
We might hope that for all sets A, we would have 
Be18(AIC) = Belc(AIB) = Bei(AIBAC). That is, 
observing B then C should be the same as observ­
ing C then B, which in turn should be the same 
as observing B A C. This is certainly the case if 
Bel is a probability function, but not in general. 
It turns out that the problem here is that informa­
tion is lost as we update the belief function. (See 
the full paper for further details of this issue.) By 
way of contrast, the DS rule of conditioning is com­
mutative. Conditioning with respect to C and then 
with respect to B is equivalent to conditioning with 
respect to B A C. However, as we have pointed out, 
it has other problems when viewed as a technique 
for updating beliefs. 
These observations suggest to us that the ques­
tion of the "best" representation of evidence does 
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not have a unique answer. It may be easier to com­
pute with a pair of belief and plausibility functions 
than to have to carry around a whole set of prob­
ability functions. Nevertheless, since information 
may be lost in this process, this ease of computation 
comes at a cost. (See [Pea89] for further examples 
of this phenomenon.) 
4 Conclusions 
We have defined a new notion of conditional belief, 
distinct from the DS notion, that seems to lead to 
more intuitive results. Our notion also allows us to 
avoid some paradoxes associated with the DS no­
tion. For example, we would expect that if both 
an agent's belief in a proposition p given q and his 
belief in p given -.q are at least a:, then his belief 
in p should be at least a:, whether or not he learns 
anything about q. This is essentially what Sav­
age [Sav54] has called the sure thing principle. It 
is easy to see that conditional probability satisfies 
the sure thing principle, but the DS conditioning 
rule does not (see [Pea89] for an example). On 
the other hand, it is easy to see that our notion of 
conditioning does satisfy the sure thing principle. 
For suppose we have an arbitrary belief function 
Bel such that Bel(plq) � a: and Bel(pl-.q) � a:. 
Choose an arbitrary probability function Pr com­
patible with Bel. By our definition of conditional 
belief as an infimum, we see that Pr(plq) � a: and 
Pr(pl-.q) � a:. So Pr(p) � a:. Thus, Pr(p) � a: for 
all probability functions Pr compatible with Bel. 
So, from Theorem 2.1, it follows that Bel(p) � a:. 
Although our results show that belief functions 
can play a useful role even when one wants to think 
probabilistically, the observations of the previous 
section do show that information can be lost if we 
pass to belief functions. This suggests they should 
be used with care. 
One thing we have not really discussed in this 
paper is what is considered perhaps the key com­
ponent of the Dempster-Shafer approach, namely, 
the rule of combination. This rule is a way of com­
bining two belief functions to obtain a third one. 
The reason we have not discussed it is that we feel 
that the rule of combination does not fit in well 
with the viewpoint of belief functions as a general­
ization of probability functions that is discussed in 
this paper. However, there is another way of view­
ing belief functions, which is as representations of 
evidence. This is in fact the view taken in [Sha76]. 
When belief is viewed as a representation of evi­
dence, then the rule of combination becomes more 
appropriate. These issues are discussed in more de­
tail in a companion paper [HF90]. 
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Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2.3 
In order to carry out this proof, it will be tech­
nically useful to think in terms of mass function 
rather than belief functions. A mass function on S 
is simply a function m: 25 -+ [0, 1] such that 
Ml. m( 0) = 0 
M2. :EA�5 m(A) = 1. 
Intuitively, m( A) is the weight of evidence for A 
that has not already been assigned to some proper 
subset of A. With this interpretation of mass, we 
would expect that an agent's belief in A is the sum 
of the masses he has assigned to all the subsets of A; 
i.e., Bel(A) = :EncA m(B). Indeed, this intuition 
is correct. 
-
Proposition 4.1: ( [Sha76, p. 39]) 
1. If m is a mass function on S, then the func­
tion Bel: 25 -+ [0, 1] defined by Bel( A) = 
:En�A m(B) is a belief function. 
2. If Bel is a belief function on 25 and S is fi­
nite, then there is a unique mass function m 
on 25 such that Bel( A) = :EncA m(B) for ev-
ery sub6et A of S. -
Recall that we want to show Bel(·IB) is a belief 
function, and PI( ·I B) is the corresponding plausi­
bility function, provided that Bel( B) > 0. For sim­
plicity in this proof, we work under the assumption 
that S is finite, so that there is a mass function m 
corresponding to Bel. We remark that using tech­
niques of [FH89b] we could drop this assumption. 
It is easy to see, using the formulas in Theo­
rem 2.2, that 
Pl(AIB) = 
= 
= 
Pl(A n B) 
PI( An B) + Bel( An B) 
1 
_ -=--
B_el_,_( A_ n_B--' )'--­
Pl(A n B) + Bel( An B) 
1 -Bel(AIB). 
Thus, once we show that Bel(·IB) is a belief func­
tion, it will immediately follow that Pl(·IB) is the 
corresponding plausibility function. 
Let Bel' be the function defined on 28 such that 
for each subset A of B, 
Bel'(A) = Bel(A)/(Bel(A) + Pl(A n B)). 
It clearly suffices to show that Bel' is a belief 
function, since for all subsets C of S, we have 
Bel(CIB) = Bel'(C n B). Once we show that Bel' 
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satisfies axioms BO-B3, it immediately follows that 
Bel(·IB) does. 
It is clear that Bel' satisfies BO-B2. All that 
remains is to show that Bel' satisfies B3. Thus we 
must show that the following inequality holds: 
Bel'(A1 u . .. u A�o) 
> L: ( -1)1II+l Bel'( n A;). 
I� { l, ... ,k) I J;t:0 iEI 
Let B1 , • • •  , B1 be the distinct sets with positive 
mass contained in B. Let A�, ... , A� be the distinct 
sets with positive mass that intersect B but are not 
subsets of B, and let Ai = A; n B, for 1 ::::; i ::::; n. 
Since Bel(B) > 0, we know that there is some Bi 
(but there may be no A;). Let a; = m(A;), and 
{jf = m(B;), for each i. Let N = 2:::7=1 a:+ :E:=l f3f. 
Note that N > 0, since there is some Bi. Let ai = 
a:fN, and !3i = (3:/N, for each i. Thus, the ai's 
and f3i 's are normalized versions of the a; 's and f3;'s. 
We want to define a mass function m' corre­
sponding to Bel'. We first need to do a small 
detour. If s1 • • •  s�o is a string, and if 1 ::::; i1 < 
· · · < ip ::::; k, then we call Bi1 • • •  B i, a substring of 
s1 • • •  Bin which we write as Bi1 • • •  Bi, j B1 • • •  Bk. 
For example, s1s3s4 is a substring of BJB2B3B4B5. 
The substring is proper if it does not equal the full 
string ..,1 • • •  s,�:; we then write Bi1 • • •  Bi, � BJ . .. s�o. 
We now define a function m", whose domain is 
{A11 ... ,A,.,B1, ... ,Bt}•, the set of finite strings 
over the alphabet consisting of the names of the 
sets with positive mass that intersect B. (We shall 
usually not bother to distinguish between a set and 
the name of a set, but, as we shall see, it is con­
venient to consider explicitly strings of names of 
sets. ) First, we let m" ( B;) = !3i, for 1 ::::; i ::::; t. As­
sume now that we have defined m" ( Bi A h .. · A i, ) 
whenever s < r and j1 < · · · < j,. Assume that 
i1 < · . . < j •. Let 
m"(B·A· ... A·) I }I }. 
{3j (1) 
L m"(BiY). 
Y -<AiJ ···Aj, 
If A is not of the form BiAh .. · Aj. with i1 < .. · < 
j., then m"(A) = 0. 
We are now ready to define the alleged mass func­
tion m'. If X is the string BiAh · · · Aj,, where 
i1 < · · · < j., then we say that X represents the 
set given by Bi U Ah U • · · U Aj,. We would like 
to let m' be simply m" (that is, by letting m' ap­
plied to a set be equal to m" applied to a string 
that represents the set, and let m'(A) = 0 for sets 
not of the form BiAh · · · Aj. ). The problem is that 
several distinct strings may represent the same set; 
for example, it is quite possible that, say, the sets 
B1 U A1 and B2 U A4 U As are the same. We define 
m'(A) to be Lx represents A m"( X). For example, 
if the set A equals both B1 U A1 and B2 U A4 U As, 
but if A is not of the form B; U Ail · · · U Aj. for any 
other choices of B;, Ail, ... , Aj. with il < · · · < j,, 
then m'(A) = m"(B1A!) + m"(B2A4As). We 
shall prove that m' is a mass function, and that 
Bel '(A) = LccA m'(C). This will show that Bel' 
is a belief funct"'ion. 
Thus, we must show that 
A. m'(0) = 0. 
B. m'(A) 2:: 0, for each A� B. 
C. LA�B m'(A) = 1. 
D. Bel'(A) = Lc�A m'(C). 
By definition of m" and m', we know that (A) 
holds. We now prove (D). Let AA:p• .. , A.�:, (where 
k1 < · · · < kq) be the A; 's contained in A, and let 
B;1, ••• , B;, be the B;'s contained in A. What is 
Bel'(A)? As before, let N = 2:�1 a:: + L�=l f3I. 
It is easy to see that Bel( A) = /3I1 + · · · + !3L, and 
Pl(A n B) = N - ( a:A,1 +···+ a: A,, + f3t1 + · · · + /3:,). 
Hence, 
Bel'(A) 
= Bel(A)/(Bel(A) + Pl(A n B)) 
(f3tl + · · · + f3t,)/( N - a:A,l - · · · - a:A,, ). 
W hen we divide numerator and denominator by N, 
we see that 
To prove (D), we must show that LccA m'(C) 
equals the right-hand side of (2). Let us call an 
expression m"(B;Ah · · ·Aj,), where i is a mem­
ber of {i1, ... ,i,}, and where i1 < ... < j, are members of {k11 ••• , kq}, a good tenn. Note 
that if m"(B;Ah · · ·Aj.) is a good term, then 
B; U Ail U · · • U Aj, �A. Now LccA m'(C) equals 
the sum of all good terms. This is because (a) 
each good term is a part of the sum defining m' (C) 
for exactly one C � A, and (b) if C � A, then 
m'(C) is defined as the sum of certain good terms. 
So we must show that the sum of all of the good 
terms equals the right-hand side of (2). Now let 
i be a fixed member of {i1, ... ,i,}. The sum of 
all good terms of the form m"(B;Ah · ·. · Aj.) ex­
cept for the good term m"(B;A,�:1 ···A.�:,) is simply 
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L m"(B;Y), 
Y -<A,1 ···A ,, 
it follows that the sum of all good terms of the form 
m"(B;Ah · · · Aj.) equals /3;/(1- 0:,1:1 -···-a:,�:,). 
So the sum of all good terms is ( /3;1 + · · · + /3;, )/(1-
a:,�:1 - · · · - a:.�=,), as desired. This proves (D). 
Now (C) follows from (D), since it is easy to see 
that Bel'(B) = 1. So we need only prove (B). The 
proof of (B) involves some nontrivial combinatorial 
arguments; the details can be found in the full pa­
per. I 
We remark that in response to an early draft 
of this paper, Zhang [Zha89] constructed a proof 
along very different lines (although also quite com­
plicated). 
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